Towards Secure and Usable Authentication for Augmented and Virtual
  Reality Head-Mounted Displays by Duezguen, Reyhan et al.
Towards Secure and Usable Authentication for
Augmented and Virtual Reality Head-Mounted Displays
Reyhan Duezguen∗, Peter Mayer∗, Sanchari Das†, Melanie Volkamer∗
∗ SECUSO - Security, Usability, Society, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
† University of Denver, Indiana University Bloomington
∗ firstname.lastname@kit.edu, † sanchari.das@du.edu
Abstract
Immersive technologies, including augmented and virtual
reality (AR & VR) devices, have enhanced digital commu-
nication along with a considerable increase in digital threats.
Thus, authentication becomes critical in AR & VR technol-
ogy, particularly in shared spaces. In this paper, we propose
applying the ZeTA protocol that allows secure authentica-
tion even in shared spaces for the AR & VR context. We
explain how it can be used with the available interaction meth-
ods provided by Head-Mounted Displays. In future work,
our research goal is to evaluate different designs of ZeTA
(e.g., interaction modes) concerning their usability and users’
risk perception regarding their security - while using a cross-
cultural approach.
1 Introduction
New-age technologies help to connect people despite geo-
graphical constraints. However, such technological evolution
brings new risks. Augmented and virtual reality (AR & VR)
are such technologies that have expanded considerably and
are projected to reach $114 billion and $65 billion, respec-
tively, by 2021 [44]. AR & VR systems like the Oculus and
Google Glass increasingly promise to provide social activities
like interactive gaming, virtual shopping, or attending virtual
meetings [46]. Many of these activities happen in so-called
shared spaces, i.e., places not strictly public, but where multi-
ple people are present at the same time [22]. However, these
technologies also introduce new security challenges in AR
& VR [24], including authentication challenges. Nowadays,
authentication on AR & VR systems is neglected or carried
out on the smartphone or PC [6]. Yet, if authentication is
required during a VR experience, e.g., paying for a product
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or entering a virtual conference, the user must take off the
Head-Mounted Display (HMD), interrupting the virtual expe-
rience. Such challenges motivated our research direction to
implement more secure and usable authentication strategies
for AR & VR devices.
A naive approach using voice recognition technology of the
HMD as an authentication strategy might put users at serious
security risks, especially in public and shared spaces. Another
method could be to use the available sensors for biometric
authentication, e.g., gait recognition [18]. Such authentication
schemes are designed for continuous authentication. The goal
of our research is to focus on authenticating services when
needed. Additionally, biometric-based approaches would
also hamper authenticating with someone else’s HMD (as it
would first need to be trained) and may have several privacy
concerns. Thus, what is needed is a secure (especially in
shared spaces) and usable authentication scheme, which only
uses the sensors of the HMDs while being privacy-preserving.
Therefore, we are proposing a shoulder-surfing resistant
authentication scheme that relies only on the equipment of
the AR & VR HMDs.
The proposed authentication scheme is based on our pre-
vious research: the Zero-Trust Authentication (ZeTA) proto-
col [23]. In this paper we describe how ZeTA can be applied
to the AR & VR context. Our future research goal is to imple-
ment the proposed authentication scheme using a user-centred
development approach and conduct user studies to evaluate its
usability and users’ risk perception. Note, since organizations
aim to provide their products and services worldwide, it is in
particular interesting to understand the cultural differences in
the use and perception of upcoming technologies like AR &
VR.
The importance of social and cultural aspects when inves-
tigating the acceptability and appropriateness of technology
are shown in many papers [3, 12, 28, 49]. Hofstede’s [48] five
cultural dimensions (namely power distance, individualism,
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation)
are widely used to quantify national differences. These cul-
tural dimensions showed many times an association towards
technology use [1,13,50]. Some studies also discovered differ-
ences on perceived usability among different cultures [40,43].
The impact of cultural aspects on the use and acceptance of
HMDs and authentication schemes has yet to be determined.
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User Web Service
User requests account
ZeTA assigns secret to user
User requests authentication
ZeTA sends challenge to user
User responds to challenge
Repeated until desired security level is reached
ZeTA grants access to user if user could respond to challenges
Enrolment requires a non-compromised device and a private channel
Authentication only requires the server to be not compromised
Figure 1: Overview of Zero-Trust Authentication (ZeTA) in AR & VR Context.
Thus, the study is going to be conducted in Germany and the
U.S. for cross-cultural analysis.
2 Related Work
Prior research has proposed and developed different authen-
tication schemes on HMDs. Yu et al. [53] and George et
al. [20] investigated well-established concepts for the VR con-
text, such as PINs or 2D and 3D sliding patterns within VR
environments. These concepts, though helpful for authentica-
tion, have some security concerns. For example, bystanders
can observe or even record the movement which can help
them to guess the password from the controller’s action.
Additionally, for AR devices like Google Glass, Islam et
al. [25] proposed tapping gestures on the glasses’ temple and
use tapping patterns as a means to authenticate. Winkler
et al. [52] introduced an authentication method that is more
resistant to observations by using AR glasses in combination
with the smartphone. The glasses show a randomly created
PIN pad on the private display according to which the user can
input password through their smartphone. Other proposals
include biometric authentication based on head and body
movement [31,37,39] or the human visual system [29,32,34].
These proposals require either additional hardware (such as a
smartphone) or a training phase to capture the user’s biometric
pattern. In contrast, our proposal requires neither.
For any proposal aiming to advance authentication for AR
& VR devices, investigating societal and cultural aspects in
technology adoption is critical. Prior studies have shown that
authentication behaviour, usage, and experience is influenced
vastly by age [11], cultural differences [2], and geographical
locations [42, 45, 51]. Riley et al. investigated regional differ-
ences in the perception of biometric authentication in India,
South Africa, and the United Kingdom [45]. Volkamer et al.
observed in a field study PIN usage at ATMs and in various
electronic payment scenarios in Germany, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom [51]. Given prior evidence, it is essential
to evaluate the impact of different countries when designing
a new authentication scheme, especially for new-age tech-
nologies. These technologies, such as AR & VR are used
worldwide where the demographical, societal, and cultural
impact can play a critical role.
Yet, in the AR & VR space, we found very little research
on cross-cultural aspects. Jung et al. [27] and Lee et al. [30]
explored the cultural differences in the adoption of mobile
AR in South Korea and Ireland. Few studies investigated the
effect of web-based AR on online shopping and compared
results from different countries inside of Europe [19, 41].
These studies identified differences in the use and perception
of mobile and web-based AR applications between countries.
Despite such critical research, to our knowledge, there are
no cross-cultural studies in AR & VR with HMDs. Thus,
comparing HMD usage in different countries in the context
of authentication will be novel and, therefore, very valuable.
3 Proposed Solution
The goal of this work is to propose an authentication scheme
for the AR & VR devices, which is resistant to observation
and only relies on the sensors integrated into the most AR &
VR HMDs. Our proposed authentication scheme is based on
our previous research on observation resistant authentication:
the Zero-Trust Authentication (ZeTA) protocol [23]. Here,
we first provide a summary of the ZeTA protocol and explain
how it could be applied in the AR & VR context.
3.1 Zero-Trust Authentication (ZeTA)
ZeTA is a knowledge-based authentication protocol, i.e., the
user has to memorize a secret analogously to text passwords.
In this section we describe its working principle, which is
also illustrated in fig. 1.
The general idea of ZeTA is to expand upon the human
capacity to build up semantic networks of related concepts
and is thus based on innate human-based computation. To
that end, ZeTA requires a knowledge base of concepts (e.g.,
words or symbols) and their semantic relations. The users’
secrets in ZeTA consist of two or more concepts and logical
connections between them (i.e., AND, OR, NOT), e.g., “yel-
low OR wheel”. This secret is generated and assigned to the
user by ZeTA during the enrolment of the user. The enrolment
has to be performed through a private channel between the
system and the user.
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The authentication is based on a challenge-response inter-
action. The user has to determine whether a specific attribute
is related to their secret or not, e.g., if the secret was “yel-
low OR wheel” and the challenge was “sunflower”, then the
correct answer would be “yes”. Note that all challenges are
pre-generated as part of the creation of the user secret and
stored as described in [23]. Thereby, the secret is chosen such
that it partitions the knowledge base equally in yes and no
challenges (i.e., half of the attributes are related to the secret
and half of the attributes are not related to the secret).
Due to its design, ZeTA can allow errors in responses
by the users to compensate for innate differences in users’
interpretations of the semantic relations between concepts.
This can potentially increase ZeTAs usability but might im-
pair security if the two are not carefully balanced. It also
highlights the importance of cultural effects. The system
repeats the challenge-response protocol until the desired cer-
tainty threshold is achieved; i.e., the probability of the user
being an impostor is sufficiently small. Consequently, ZeTA
can be scaled seamlessly to arbitrary security levels. When
user errors are not allowed during an authentication attempt,
according to [23] ZeTa can easily reach PIN-level security
with 14 challenges. The usual online guessing threshold of
106 [16] can be achieved as easily using 25 challenges, while
even allowing for one error by the user [23].
As stated above, the enrolment procedure of ZeTA relies on
a private channel. In contrast, after the enrolment, ZeTA was
designed with the threat model as introduced by Matsumoto
and Imai [35] in mind. The attacker can compromise the
communication channels and even the user’s device. Thus,
ZeTA relies only on the server being secure. Proofs for lower
bounds on the number of observations required to learn a
secret based on a probably approximately correct learning
model are presented in the original publication [23].
3.2 Application in the AR & VR context
Augmented and Virtual Reality HMDs provide various inter-
action methods depending on the capabilities of the device.
Examples of input systems are controller, head movement,
gesture, and voice recognition. The core output system is
the private display (i.e., optics that create the virtual image)
combined with audio. The idea underlying the usage of ZeTA
in the AR & VR context is that the challenge is shown on the
display of the HMDs. The user responses are entered using
input options, which can be found in most of the AR & VR
HMDs. Thus, we avoid dependencies on additional hardware.
Concerning the entry of the response to the system’s challenge
by the user, the following interaction options can be used: 1)
voice control, 2) head movement, and 3) buttons on the VR
controller or touch controls on the AR glasses. Additionally,
finding the right number of challenges as a trade-off between
usability and security while considering the specifics of the
AR/VR context is an important aspect of the development of
the ZeTA implementations for our user study.
The advantage of using ZeTA as an authentication scheme
for the AR/VR context is that shoulder-surfing resistance does
not need to be empirically evaluated due to the aforemen-
tioned security proofs. Therefore, the lower bound of needed
observations holds no matter whether the attacker observes
the communication channel, the user’s interaction, or even
the private display of the HMD. The user input can even be
processed by the web server and does not need to burden the
capacity of the HMD without impairing the user’s privacy.
The only time the user is required to use a non-compromised
device and a private channel is when being assigned the secret
by ZeTA during enrolment.
3.3 Future Design and Implementation
The proposed authentication scheme will be implemented
as mock-up for both AR & VR HMDs, as well as for each
interaction method. The development is based on a human-
centered design approach: the mock-ups are tested and im-
proved iteratively by evaluating different design variations of
the outputs and inputs with users to maximize the authenti-
cation scheme’s usability. Options for the output to show the
challenges are text, image, and audio. Options for the input of
the responses are: voice, head movement, and buttons/touch
controls (cf. section 3.2). There might also be different ap-
proaches to give feedback to the user after answering each
challenge or to proceed from one challenge to the next one.
4 Proposed Methodology for User Evaluation
As future work, we will evaluate the three interaction methods
of the proposed authentication scheme through in-lab user
studies. We are planning to use Google Glass for the AR
application and the Oculus Rift S for the VR application. The
study design is built upon our research on shoulder-surfing
resistant authentication using gamepads [36].
4.1 Research Goal
The evaluation of the authentication scheme for each of the
AR & VR HMDs and each of the three interaction methods
(voice, head movement, and touch/press) will be based on
usability criteria and users’ risk perception regarding the au-
thentication protocol security. Usability is measured by users
effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction with the authentica-
tion scheme. Thus, our research goal for future work is:
Identifying the best interaction method for authenticating
through ZeTA on both, AR & VR HMDs, i.e., the method that
provides the highest effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction
as well as the lowest perceived risk by users regarding the
security of the authentication process.
We aim to inspect the cross-cultural influence by conducting
identical studies in Germany and the United States. Germany
and the U.S. are interesting cultures to compare because
of their global influence in the field of technology [21, 38].
Both of these nations share much in common (democratic
governments, similar linguistic roots), they also have some in-
teresting differences (ethical heterogeneity, capitalistic versus
socialistic approach) [47]. Additionally, it is predicted that the
AR/VR market will rise globally, especially in U.S. (96.1%
Compound annual growth rate (CAGR)) and in Western Eu-
ropean countries (104.2% CAGR), including Germany [8].
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Figure 2: Main study protocol.
4.2 Study Protocol
After completing the implementation, a pre-study is planned
to pilot and refine the study protocol of the main study, which
is described below. The authentication scheme is tested with
each combination of the device (i.e., AR, VR) and interac-
tion method (i.e., voice, head gestures, button/touch controls)
regarding its usability and users’ risk perception regarding
its security mechanism. The study will be conducted in both,
Germany and the United States. Therefore, 12 (2x3x2) groups
are used to collect data as visualized in fig. 3.
Each participant will test all three interaction methods. To
avoid first-order carryover effects, the allocation of the partic-
ipants will be specified with the Latin Square Design [7] that
counterbalances sequential effects. The procedure of the main
study is presented in figure 2. We will ask two participants
to come to the lab simultaneously. Both of the participants
will receive an explanation of the ZeTA scheme and will be
given a user scenario with three different randomly generated
passwords. Then, we will run a 3-step evaluation process:
1. Participant-1 authenticates on the HMD three times.
Participant-2 observes the process.
2. Now they change roles: participant-2 authenticates on
the HMD three times. Participant-1 observes the process.
3. Both participants answer questions in a survey as well
as we conclude with a short semi-structured interview.
By having two participants in the lab simultaneously, we
aim to create a higher validity setting with respect to evalu-
ating users’ risk perception. Secrets will be assigned to the
participants by the system. Each of them will have time alone
to memorize their secret. As a baseline for the configuration,
we propose to use the online guessing resistance threshold of
106 [16]. This is in line with the envisioned types of accounts
used on the HMDs (e.g., purchasing media content from on
online service). Before conducting the study, we will ask for
ethical approval. Participants will be compensated based on
the minimum wage regulations in the U.S. and Germany.
Figure 3: Allocation of the groups in the main user study.
The effectiveness will be measured by the ratio of correct
password entries among the three. Efficiency will be assessed
by the average time needed for authentication across the three
passwords. Satisfaction will be measured with the System
Usability Scale (SUS) that covers users’ subjective reactions
to using the scheme [4]. To examine the user’s risk percep-
tion, the scales proposed by Fischhoff et al. [15], Liang &
Xue [33], and Das [9] will be adapted to our use case. The
risk perception metric is defined by nine characteristics of
the risk: 1) voluntariness, 2) immediacy, 3) knowledge of the
exposed, 4) knowledge of experts, 5) control, 6) newness, 7)
common-dread, 8) chronic-catastrophic, and 9) severity. Of-
fline, this framework informed four decades of research in risk
perception and public policy in a diversity of risk domains,
e.g., environmental risk [17] and health risk [26]. Online, this
framework has been used to explain perceptions of technical
security risks [5, 10] and insider threats [14].
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